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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 For this installment of the Recent Developments, we examine 
three recent United States Supreme Court decisions and one recent 
Florida Supreme Court decision. Note One examines Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld,1 where the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the authority of 
the military commission convened to try a captured Yemini national 
and what role the Geneva Conventions would play in that proceed-
ing.2 Note Two examines Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway 
Co. v. White,3 where the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the correct 
interpretation of the language of Title VII’s antiretaliation provi-
sion.4 Note Three examines Garcetti v. Ceballos,5 where the U.S. Su-
preme Court addressed the First Amendment rights of a public em-
ployee within the scope of that employee’s employment.6 Finally, 
Note Four examines In Re: Amendment to the Rules Regulating the 
Florida Bar—Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B) of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct,7 where the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether client 
waiver is allowed concerning a recent controversial constitutional 
amendment that capped attorney’s fees in medical malpractice ac-
tions.8  
                                                                                                                    
 1. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
 2. Brian Sites contributed this Note. 
 3. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006). 
 4. Roland Hermida contributed this Note. 
 5. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). 
 6. Rick Englebright contributed this Note. 
 7. 939 So. 2d 1032, 1036-37 (Fla. 2006). 
 8. Stephanie Tañada contributed this Note.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW–THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO ESTABLISH 
MILITARY COMMISSIONS: A QUESTION OF NECESSITY–Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
 The September 11th attacks on the Twin Towers and the Penta-
gon set in motion some of the most controversial legal issues of this 
century. Among them is the power of the President in establishing 
military commissions—a type of tribunal that differs from courts-
martial courts—and what procedural requirements exist for such 
commissions under the Constitution and other laws. Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld9 marked the close of the most recent chapter in this de-
bate, though the questions Hamdan left unanswered signals that 
further litigation of these issues is likely. 
 Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni national, was captured by mili-
tia forces during hostilities between the Taliban and the United 
States in November 2001. Hamdan was transferred to an American 
prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in June 2002, and was deemed by 
the President as triable by military commission in July 2003. He was 
appointed military counsel in December, who two months later filed 
demands for charges and a speedy trial under the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 810. The legal adviser denied 
the request in February 2004, and Hamdan filed petitions for writs of 
habeas corpus and mandamus in the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Washington.10 He was charged in July 2004 in a 
thirteen-paragraph, unsigned charging document which alleged that 
(1) he acted as Osama bin Laden’s bodyguard and personal driver, (2) 
he arranged for and transported weapons for al Qaeda and used such 
weapons himself, (3) he drove Osama bin Laden to various events at 
which bin Laden encouraged attacks against America, and (4) he was 
trained in weapons use at al Qaeda-sponsored training camps.11  
 Upon the issuance of the formal charge, the District Court for the 
Western District of Washington transferred Hamdan’s writ petitions 
to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.12 Meanwhile, 
Hamdan was designated in a separate military proceeding as an “en-
emy combatant.”13 The District Court thereafter granted Hamdan’s 
habeas corpus petition and the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit subsequently reversed.14 The U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to address “whether the military commission con-
 
 9. Id. at 2759-60. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 2760-61. 
 12. Id. at 2761. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 2761-62. 
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vened to try Hamdan has authority to do so, and whether Hamdan 
may rely on the Geneva Conventions in these proceedings.”15
 The Court first addressed the Government’s motion to dismiss, in 
which the Government argued that the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005 (DTA), sections 1005(e)(1) and 1005(h), stripped jurisdiction 
from the Court for Hamdan’s habeas petition.16 The Court noted that 
the language of section 1005(e)(1) and its subparts specifically re-
moved jurisdiction for future claims and proceeded to consider 
whether it also removed jurisdiction for habeas petitions pending at 
the time of the DTA’s enactment.17 The Court observed that the ef-
fect of the DTA on pending habeas petitions was specifically ad-
dressed under section 1005(h): “Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection 
(e) apply . . . to any claim . . . that is pending on or after the date of 
the enactment of this Act.”18 Noting that § 1005(h) specifically omit-
ted reference to section 1005(e)(1), the paragraph that the Govern-
ment alleged stripped jurisdiction, the Court concluded that Con-
gress plainly intended section 1005(e)(1) to apply only to actions un-
dertaken after the DTA was enacted.19 The Court supported its con-
clusion by observing that sections 1005(e)(2) and 1005(e)(3) were ex-
pressly specified in section 1005(h), but no mention of section 
1005(e)(1) was made,20 and that Congress rejected earlier proposed 
versions of the DTA that included paragraph (1) along with para-
graphs (2) and (3) in section 1005(h).21 The Court also rejected the 
Government’s argument that this jurisdiction-creating statute raised 
special retroactivity concerns, as “subsections (e)(2) and (e)(3) . . . 
cannot conceivably give rise to retroactivity questions under our 
precedent.”22 It then rejected the Government’s assertion that the 
Court’s reading of section 1005(h) “produces absurd result[s]” by 
granting dual jurisdiction over detainee cases because, at least for 
Hamdan, no dual jurisdiction existed.23 Leaving open the questions 
of whether Congress could permissibly strip courts of habeas juris-
diction and whether the type of suspension the DTA employs is con-
stitutional, the Court held Congress intended no removal of jurisdic-
tion for pending habeas claims under section 1005(h) of the DTA.24
 
 15. Id. at 2762. 
 16. Id. at 2762-63. 
 17. Id. at 2762-64. 
 18. Id. at 2763. 
 19. Id. at 2769. 
 20. Id. at 2766. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 2768. 
 23. The Court also dismissed Justice Scalia’s argument that section 1005(e)(1) plainly 
indicated an intent to strip jurisdiction in pending cases and also rejected the Govern-
ment’s argument that Congress would have no reason to leave jurisdiction in place for 
pending claims if it was stripping jurisdiction for future claims. Id. 
 24. Id. at 2769. 
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 Next, the Court addressed the Government’s argument that, un-
der its prior decision in Schlesinger v. Councilman,25 the Court 
should abstain “as a matter of comity . . . from intervening in pend-
ing [military] proceedings.”26 The Court distinguished Councilman’s 
applicability to Hamdan on the grounds that Councilman stood only 
for two comity/abstention principles: first, the military discipline of 
the Armed Forces is more efficient, and thus the branch of military 
itself is more efficient, if it operates without frequent civilian-judicial 
interference; and second, courts should “respect the balance that 
Congress struck between military preparedness and fairness to indi-
vidual service members” in creating military tribunals.27 Petitioner 
Hamdan, the Court reasoned, was not a member of the U.S. military, 
and the military commission that would otherwise have tried him is 
not part of the “integrated system of military courts, complete with 
independent review panels, that Congress has established.”28 Thus, 
Councilman and its dual comity considerations did not favor absten-
tion. Instead, Ex Parte Quirin29 applied and demonstrated clearly 
that the Court could entertain challenges to already-commenced 
military commissions.30 Thus, there was no need to defer to the mili-
tary commissions. Having addressed the procedural arguments, the 
Court proceeded to the merits of Hamdan’s challenge. 
 The Court began by reviewing the history of military commis-
sions, tracing their roots to situations of “military necessity.”31 Again 
leaving the most intriguing questions open—including whether the 
President may convene military commissions without Congress’ 
sanction in times of “controlling necessity”32—the Court noted that 
the power of the President to convene military commissions was ex-
pressly conditioned on the President complying with the law of war.33 
It found no congressional authorization for military commissions in 
the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)34 or the DTA, 
nor was the Court persuaded that either intended to expand the 
 
 25. 420 U.S. 738 (1975). 
 26. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2770 (discussing Councilman). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 2771. 
 29. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 30. Hamdan, 126 U.S. at 2771. 
 31. Id. at 2772-73. 
 32. Id. at 2774 (“Whether . . . the President may constitutionally convene military 
commissions without the sanction of Congress in cases of controlling necessity is a question 
this Court has not answered definitively, and need not answer today.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 33. Id. (citing Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1942)). 
 34. The AUMF provides authorization to “use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, com-
mitted, or aided the terrorist attacks . . . in order to prevent any future acts of interna-
tional terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” Id. 
at 2760.  
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President’s ability to form military commissions under the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).35 The proper inquiry, then, was 
whether the commission convened to try Hamdan was justified under 
“the Constitution and laws, including the law of war.”36  
 Hamdan’s commission contained several elements the Court con-
sidered fatal defects under the Constitution and law of war: (1) 
Hamdan and his counsel could be excluded from any hearing that 
was deemed “close[d]”;37 (2) Hamdan and his counsel could be pre-
cluded from ever learning what evidence was presented during closed 
proceedings;38 (3) “any evidence that, in the opinion of the presiding 
officer, would have probative value to a reasonable person” could be 
admitted, including testimonial hearsay and testimony obtained 
through coercion;39 and (4) civilian counsel and/or Hamdan could be 
denied access to certain evidence if the evidence was probative and if 
deprivation of access to the defendant would not result in the denial 
of a “full and fair trial.”40  
 The Government defended that Hamdan’s challenge to these al-
leged defects was precluded by the abstention doctrine of Council-
men; that Hamdan could raise these challenges after the “final deci-
sion” of the commission; and that there was no reason to assume that 
the trial, once commenced, would not “be conducted in good faith and 
according to the law.”41 The Court was not persuaded by any of the 
three arguments.42 The Court held that, though the President has 
the authority to promulgate rules of procedure for military commis-
 
 35. Id. at 2774-75. 
 36. Id. at 2775 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 37. Id. at 2786.Proceedings could be deemed “close[d]” on the following grounds:  
the protection of information classified or classifiable . . . ; information pro-
tected by law or rule from unauthorized disclosure; the physical safety of par-
ticipants in Commission proceedings, including prospective witnesses; intelli-
gence and law enforcement sources, methods, or activities; and other national 
security interests.  
Id. (quoting Commission Order No.1 § 6(B)(3), Aug. 31, 2005) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The Court noted the “accused may also be excluded from the proceedings if he 
engages in disruptive conduct.” Id. at 2786 n.42 (quoting Commission Order No. 1 § 5(K)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Appointed military counsel may be privy to closed ses-
sions but may be forbidden from disclosing what occurred. Id. 
 38. Id. at 2786. 
 39. Id. (quoting Commission Order No.1 § 6(D)(1)). 
 40. Id. at 2787 (quoting Commission Order No.1 § 6(D)(5)(b)). The Court discussed 
several other elements of the commission’s methods disapprovingly, but, beyond the 
above enumerated elements, it is unclear what role they played, if any, in the Court’s 
ultimate disposition. 
 41. Id. at 2787 (quoting the Government’s brief). 
 42. First, the Court dismissed the Councilmen-abstention claim for the same reasons 
discussed above.  Id. at 2787-88. Next, it concluded that, in reality, Hamdan might not be 
able to contest a final order, as only death sentences or those equal to or greater than ten-
year imprisonment were reviewable by right. Id. Finally, the Court concluded that there 
was a basis for assuming the commission’s proceedings would depart from the requirement 
of law because Hamdan had already been excluded from his trial. Id. 
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sions, his power to do so was restricted by the UCMJ. First, the 
President cannot adopt procedural rules contrary to the UCMJ, and 
second, the rules he adopts must be uniform, as much as is practica-
ble, for both military commissions and courts martial.43 The Court 
then rejected the Government’s provided explanations for why the 
military commissions and courts-martial courts differed. Further, the 
Court avoided the question of whether any provision of Commission 
Order No. 1 was contrary to the UCMJ by concluding that the Presi-
dent had not provided a sufficient explanation of why uniformity be-
tween courts-martial and military commission proceedings was not 
practicable.44 In particular, the Court focused on the exclusion of the 
defendant as “the jettisoning of so basic a right [that it] cannot 
lightly be excused as ‘practicable’ “ and, as no explanation for the dis-
crepancy had been given, that discrepancy was not justified.45 Noting 
further that the procedures of the military commission adopted to try 
Hamdan violated the Geneva Convention, the Court held that the 
commission convened to try Hamdan was insufficient.46
 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer 
(in a plurality opinion that Justice Kennedy did not join) also noted 
that the charge of conspiracy brought against Hamdan was not 
brought in a theater of war, involved events that did not occur during 
any war, and involved “overt acts” not in violation of the law of war.47 
Justice Stevens wrote that, as military commissions only have juris-
diction if the offenses charged take place during a war and in a thea-
ter of war and are violations of the law of war, Hamdan’s commission 
“lacks authority to try [him].”48 Unpersuaded by the Government’s of-
fered precedent that it believed established conspiracy as an offense 
 
 43. Id. at 2790 (quoting the UCMJ, Article 36(a) and (b)). 
 44. Id. at 2791. The Government suggested that the simple fact of danger to the U.S. 
from international terrorism rendered uniformity impracticable. The Court rejected this argu-
ment out of hand, “[w]ithout for one moment underestimating that danger.” Id. at 2792. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 2798. In considering the Geneva Conventions, the Court addressed three 
arguments advanced by the Government. First, it rejected the Government’s claim that ab-
sention under Councilmen was appropriate. Id. at 2793. Second, the Court concluded that 
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), though advanced by the Government as the 
controlling precedent, was not applicable to Hamdan because at a minimum the Geneva 
Conventions are a part of the law of war and thus the commissions must comply with its 
terms. Id. at 2793-94. On this same point, the Court rejected the holding of the court of ap-
peals that the war with al Qaeda is one that the Geneva Conventions do not reach. Id. at 
2795. Citing Common Article 3 of the Conventions as an example of one provision the 
Court considered clearly applied, the Court quoted its requirement of a trial that affords 
“all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples” by a 
“regularly constituted court.” Id. at 2795-97. Because military commissions did not consti-
tute “regularly constituted court[s],” they did not comply with the Geneva Conventions. Id. 
Finally, having shown that the Conventions had application, the Court rejected that they 
were not judicially enforceable. Id. 
 47. Id. at 2777-78. 
 48. Id. at 2785. 
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under the laws of war, the plurality concluded that the Government 
failed “to satisfy the most basic precondition—at least in the absence 
of specific congressional authorization—for [the] establishment of 
military commissions: military necessity.”49 Justice Stevens, writing 
for the same plurality later, also expressed the belief that, “absent 
express statutory provisions to the contrary, information used to 
convict a person of a crime must be disclosed to him”50 or else the 
commission fails to afford “all the judicial guarantees which are rec-
ognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”51   
 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, 
rebuffed the claims of the dissenting Justices that the Court’s hold-
ing would “sorely hamper the President’s ability to confront and de-
feat a new and deadly enemy.”52  Instead, Justice Breyer wrote, “[t]he 
Court’s conclusion ultimately rests upon a single ground: Congress 
has not issued the Executive a ‘blank check.’ . . . Nothing prevents 
the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he be-
lieves necessary [to create military commissions].”53
 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, 
expressed his belief that the Military Commission Order No. 1 ex-
ceeded limits enacted by Congress. Justice Kennedy went on to reit-
erate the Court’s conclusion that uniformity between courts-martial 
and military commissions was required54 and the the requirement of 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of “regularly consti-
tuted court[s] [that afford rights] . . . recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples.”55
 Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, dissented, 
characterizing the majority’s holding as transforming the DTA’s “no 
court, justice, or judge [shall have jurisdiction]” language into some-
thing allowing “every ‘court, justice, or judge’ . . . to hear, consider, 
and render judgment.”56 Citing “[a]n ancient and unbroken line of 
authority,” Justice Scalia argued that “statutes ousting jurisdiction 
unambiguously apply to cases pending at their effective date.”57 
Chiding the majority for “apparently believ[ing] that the effective-
date provision means nothing at all”58 and stating that the Court 
“cannot cite a single case in the history of Anglo-American law . . . in 
which a jurisdiction-stripping provision was denied immediate ef-
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 2798. 
 51. Id. at 2797 (citation omitted). 
 52. Id. at 2799 (quoting id. at 2838 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 2801. 
 55. Id. at 2802. 
 56. Id. at 2810 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 2812 n.1. 
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fect.” Justice Scalia pointed to “the cases granting . . . immediate ef-
fect [to such provisions, which are] legion.”59 The distinction, Scalia 
argued, comes in part from that, “[f]or better or for worse, our recent 
cases have contrasted jurisdiction-creating provisions with jurisdic-
tion-ousting provisions . . . [and have] strongly indicat[ed] that the 
former are typically retroactive.”60 As “[t]he exclusive-review pro-
visions of the DTA . . . confer new jurisdiction (in the D.C. Circuit),” 
the “dazzling clarity” that the Court concluded exists as to its retro-
activity jurisprudence missed, according to Scalia, important 
points.61 Closing off with a criticism of the majority’s reliance on and 
use of legislative history62 and a brief salvo aimed at the flood of ha-
beas petitions the majority’s holding potentially allows,63 Justice 
Scalia then turned to the majority’s remaining procedural holdings. 
 First, Scalia concluded that Hamdan “has no [habeas] rights un-
der the Suspension Clause” because he is detained “outside the sov-
ereign ‘territorial jurisdiction’ of the United States.”64 Next, Scalia 
attempted to close one of the questions the majority left open65 by 
stating that “[i]t is not clear how there could be any . . . lurking ques-
tions [as to Congress’ ability to impinge on the Court’s appellate ju-
risdiction] in light of the aptly named ‘Exceptions Clause’ of Article 
III, § 2 [which allows for such impingement].”66 Finally, Scalia 
wrapped up by criticizing the majority’s refusal to abstain from con-
sidering Hamdan’s habeas petition and its attempts to distinguish 
the most on-point case, Councilman.67 On these procedural grounds, 
he reiterated, Justice Scalia strongly dissented. 
 Justice Thomas, with whom Justices Scalia and Alito joined in 
part, also dissented, but to address the majority’s substantive, non-
jurisdictional arguments.68 First, Justice Thomas noted the historical 
roles of the three branches “in the conduct of war”69 and argued that 
“the fact that Congress has provided the President with broad au-
thorities does not imply—and the Judicial Branch should not infer—
that Congress intended to deprive him of particular powers not spe-
cifically enumerated.”70 In sum, Justice Thomas argued the Court 
 
 59. Id. at 2812. 
 60. Id. at 2813. 
 61. Id. at 2813-14. 
 62. Id. at 2814-17. 
 63. Id. at 2817-18. 
 64. Id. at 2818. 
 65. “ ‘[T]he Government’s preferred reading’ would ‘rais[e] grave questions about 
Congress’ authority to impinge upon this Court’s appellate jurisdiction, particularly in ha-
beas cases.” Id. at 2819 (quoting id. at 2764 (majority opinion)). 
 66. Id. at 2819. 
 67. Id. at 2820-21. 
 68. Id. at 2823. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 2823-24. 
2007]                          RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1005 
 
                                                                                                                   
should give “a heavy measure of deference” to the President’s deci-
sions in this case.71 Turning often to this thread of deference, defer-
ence to either the President or to military commissions generally, 
Justice Thomas then went on to criticize the plurality’s and major-
ity’s analysis of the four requirements for a military commission’s 
valid exercise of jurisdiction.72 In particular, Thomas argued that 
“[f]or well over a century it has been established that ‘to unite with 
[enemy forces] is a high offense against the law of war’ “73 and there-
fore the Government’s charges against Hamdan consist of “war 
crime[s] chargeable before a military commission.”74 After citing vari-
ous examples in support of his argument,75 Justice Thomas pointed 
out that Hamdan was also charged with not just membership in an 
enemy group organized to “kill [and] disabl[e] . . . peaceable citizens 
or soldiers”76 but also with “aid[ing] and assist[ing] al Qaeda’s top 
leadership by supplying weapons, transportation, and other ser-
vices”77 and, more generally, with “conspir[ing] . . . to commit . . . of-
fenses triable by military commission.”78 Finally, Justice Thomas con-
cluded by criticizing the majority’s conclusion that the President failed 
to justify the departure from the terms of the UCMJ and the Geneva 
Conventions, decrying the majority’s position as “untenable.”79
 Lastly, Justice Alito, joined in part by Justices Scalia and Tho-
mas, also dissented. Justice Alito disagreed with the majority that, 
under the Geneva Convention, a military commission is not a “regu-
larly constituted court” as the Convention requires.80 Reading “regu-
larly constituted” to be synonymous with “properly constituted,” Jus-
tice Alito concluded that military commissions are “established in ac-
cordance with the domestic law of the appointing country.”81
 
 71. Id. at 2824. 
 72. E.g., id. at 2826 (criticizing “[t]he plurality’s willingness to second-guess the Ex-
ecutive’s judgments in this context”); id. at 2830 (criticizing the majority’s failure to recog-
nize “the presumption we acknowledged in Quirin, namely, that the actions of military 
commissions are ‘not to be set aside by the courts without the clear conviction that they 
are’ unlawful”) (citations omitted); cf. id. at 2835 (“The civil War experience provides fur-
ther support for the President’s conclusion that conspiracy to violate the laws of war is an 
offense cognizable before law-of-war military commissions.”). 
 73. Id. at 2831-32. 
 74. Id. at 2831. 
 75. One such example Justice Thomas cites that “confirm[s] by experience” that 
“membership in an organization whose purpose is to violate the laws of war is an offense triable 
by military commissions” is the military tribunals convened at Nuremberg. Id. at 2833. 
 76. Id. at 2832. 
 77. Id. at 2833. 
 78. Id. at 2834. 
 79. Id. at 2839, 2844. 
 80. Id.at 2850. 
 81. See id. at 2850-51 (finding that “regularly constituted” requires “properly consti-
tuted” and reciting the text quoted above); id. at 2851-55 (finding that the commissions are 
“regularly constituted” and otherwise legitimate). 
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 Drawing sharp lines in the sand on questions of fundamental im-
portance, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld sets the stage for inquiry into now-
essential functions of the government. In an era where the United 
States is increasingly aware of terrorism threats within and without 
its borders, the roles of the President, the Judiciary, and military 
courts generally are firmly under the spotlight. Hamdan will almost 
certainly not be the final chapter of these underlying issues. 
EMPLOYMENT LAW–THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF TITLE VII’S 
ANTIRETALIATION PROVISION–Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006). 
 The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided the case of Burlington 
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,82 an employment law 
case. Shelia White brought a Title VII claim alleging employee dis-
crimination and retaliation against Burlington. The Supreme Court’s 
primary task in its review of the case was determining the correct in-
terpretation of the language of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision.83
 The facts surrounding White’s claims began in June 1997, when 
she interviewed with roadmaster Marvin Brown for a job at Burling-
ton’s Tennessee Yard.84 During the interview, Brown expressed in-
terest in White’s previous experience operating a forklift.85 Burling-
ton eventually hired White as a track laborer. A track laborer’s du-
ties included “removing and replacing track components, transport-
ing track material, cutting brush, and clearing litter and cargo spill-
age from the right-of-way.”86 Shortly after her hiring, the forklift op-
eration position became available when the worker holding the po-
sition asked for a reassignment of his responsibilities.87 Upon his 
transfer to another job for Burlington, Brown assigned White to 
forklift duty.88
 In September 1997, White complained that her immediate super-
visor, Bill Joiner, continually made comments to her that women 
should not be allowed to work for the railway and also made other 
insulting comments to her in front of her male coworkers.89 Burling-
ton suspended Joiner for ten days based on White’s complaints.90 
Shortly after Joiner’s suspension, Brown informed White that she 
was being relieved of her forklift operating duties to return to her du-
                                                                                                                    
 82. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006). 
 83. Id. at 2409 (reviewing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
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ties as a track laborer.91 The supervisor explained that White’s co-
workers, all male, complained that the forklift job should go to a 
more “senior man.”92   
 Upon her return to the track laborer position, White filed a com-
plaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
on October 10, 1997, alleging that her reassignment to the track la-
borer position was gender-based discrimination and retaliation for 
the complaints she made regarding Joiner’s harassment.93 In Decem-
ber, White filed a second retaliation charge with the EEOC, claiming 
that Brown placed her under surveillance and was monitoring her 
daily activities.94 Shortly after White filed her EEOC charge, White 
and her immediate supervisor Percy Sharkey had a disagreement, 
the details of which are in dispute, regarding which truck White 
should use in her transportation to and from different areas of the 
job site.95 After the disagreement occurred, Sharkey informed Brown 
that White was insubordinate and, as a result, Brown suspended 
White without pay.96  
 White sought relief through Burlington’s internal grievance pro-
cedures for the railway. Through those procedures, Burlington even-
tually found that White was not insubordinate in her disagreement 
with Sharkey.97 Burlington then reinstated White and reimbursed 
her for the thirty-seven days she went without pay. Despite her rein-
statement with back pay, White filed another retaliation claim with 
the EEOC based on her suspension.98 After exhausting all of her ad-
ministrative remedies with the EEOC, White filed her Title VII claim 
against Burlington in federal district court, alleging that Burling-
ton’s actions in changing her position and duties, as well as her 
thirty-seven-day suspension, constituted unlawful retaliation in vio-
lation of Title VII.99 After a trial, the jury found in favor of White on 
both retaliation claims and awarded her $43,500 in compensatory 
damages.100 The district court also denied Burlington’s motion for 
judgment as a matter of law.101 Burlington appealed the district 
court’s decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.102
                                                                                                                    
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 3(a) (2000). 
 100. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2409. 
 101. Id. at 2410. 
 102. Id. 
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 The divided Sixth Circuit originally reversed the district court’s 
decision, finding that actions taken by Burlington in regard to 
White’s employment did not amount to the “adverse employment ac-
tion” required to sustain a retaliation claim under Title VII.103 In so 
finding, the court stated that the “fact that forklift duty is less physi-
cally demanding than track maintenance work does not make 
White’s reassignment a cognizable adverse employment action.”104 
Further, the court found that the district court erred in finding 
White’s suspension without pay was an adverse employment ac-
tion.105 The court cited the fact that White’s suspension was not an 
“ultimate employment decision.”106 Rather, it was only “the first step 
in the employment decision making process,” which ultimately re-
sulted in White receiving reimbursement for any and all lost pay and 
benefits she suffered during the suspension.107  
 Shortly after its reversal of the district court’s decision, however, 
the full court of appeals abandoned the decision and decided to hear 
the appeal en banc.108 After the rehearing, the court affirmed the dis-
trict court’s decision as it pertained to both of White’s retaliation 
claims. In its reexamination of the district court’s decision, the Sixth 
Circuit focused its efforts on defining “adverse employment action” as 
it appears in the language of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision.109 
The pertinent language of the antiretaliation statute, which the 
Sixth Circuit cited in its en banc decision, states, “It shall be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate 
against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . be-
cause he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testi-
fied, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, pro-
ceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”110 The phrase, “discrimi-
nate against,” as used in the statute, is undefined. However, as the 
court cited in its decision, case law shows that not every act of dis-
crimination falls under that definition.111 Thus, the statute requires 
a “tangible” discriminatory act.112  
                                                                                                                    
 103. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. , 310 F.3d 443, 451 (6th Cir. 2002).
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 451-53. 
 106. Id. at 453. 
 107. Id. at 454. 
 108. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000) (section 704(a) of Title VII).
 110. Id.; White, 364 F.3d at 795. 
 111. White, 364 F.3d at 795 (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 
(1998) (listing cases requiring a “tangible employment action” to support a Title VII claim)). 
 112. Id.  
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 The first retaliation case decided on the adverse employment ele-
ment in the Sixth Circuit involved a temporary job reassignment.113 
In that case, the court found that such an action, which did not result 
in any pay loss or decrease, did not constitute an adverse employ-
ment action.114 Ten years later, the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue 
again. In that case, the court stated that an employment action must 
be “a materially adverse change in the terms of her employment” and 
not just a “mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibili-
ties.”115 Further, the court stated that the Kocsis opinion is the lead-
ing case for defining an adverse employment action in the Sixth Cir-
cuit and also noted the Supreme Court’s adoption of the case.116 
Thus, it appears that under the Sixth Circuit’s definition of an ad-
verse employment action, there must be some direct, tangible harm 
to the employee usually resulting in monetary harm. 
 However, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of adverse employ-
ment action differs from that of the EEOC. The EEOC’s interpreta-
tion takes a literal approach to the “any discriminatory act” language 
of Title VII.117 Under such an interpretation, any discriminatory act, 
including de minimis ones not recognized by the Sixth Circuit, would 
violate Title VII’s retaliation statute.118 However, the EEOC’s guide-
lines, while significant in interpreting Title VII, are merely guide-
lines and not binding on courts.119 Thus, the Sixth Circuit found its 
interpretation of the language of Title VII sufficiently captures the 
meaning that Congress intended in drafting the statute.120
 After determining the proper definition of “adverse employment 
action,” the Sixth Circuit applied the definition to both of White’s re-
taliation claims. In applying the definition to the White’s claim aris-
ing out of her suspension without pay, the court compared the facts 
of White’s claim to a similar case decided by the court in 1999.121 In 
that case, the court examined whether a Vanderbilt University pro-
fessor suffered an adverse employment action when the dean denied 
the professor tenure and informed her that her position would termi-
nate on August 31, 1995.122 Before her contract expired, the professor 
                                                                                                                    
 113. Id. at 797 (citing Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 638 (6th Cir.1987)).
 114. Id. (citing Ferguson v. C.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1201 
(D. Del. 1983)).
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761 (finding that “[a] tangible employment action 
constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to 
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a 
significant change in benefits”)).
 117. Id. at 799. 
 118. Id. at 800. 
 119. Id. at 798. 
 120. Id. at 798-99. 
 121. See Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 542 (6th Cir.1999).
 122. Id. at 543. 
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filed a Title VII action.123 In November 1995, while her lawsuit was 
pending, the university’s board of trustees met and reversed the 
dean’s decision to fire the professor.124 In doing so, the board rehired 
her as a tenured professor and reimbursed her for the losses suffered 
because of her delay in promotion and her unemployment. Based on 
the board’s actions, the court found that no adverse employment ac-
tion occurred. The court reasoned that the board’s rehearing of the 
professor’s firing was the “ultimate employment decision” and that 
the firing was only an intermediate decision.125 However, nothing in 
the language of Title VII restricts its application to “ultimate em-
ployment decisions.” Thus, the court noted that most circuits now re-
ject any interpretation of Title VII limiting the reach of the statute to 
ultimate employment decisions and joined that majority.126
 Furthermore, the court noted that the actions taken against 
White were not those that court meant to exclude from the reach of 
Title VII by reading the adverse employment action requirement into 
the statute.127 The court explained that while White was reimbursed 
for her suspension, that is not enough to remove the case from the 
reach of Title VII’s protections.128 That is, if White’s suspension was 
motivated by discriminatory intent, it is a violation of Title VII, 
whether or not they ultimately reimbursed her.129
 The Sixth Circuit also examined whether White’s job transfer was 
a violation of Title VII’s retaliation provision. The court agreed with 
the district court and found that it did.130 Essentially, the court found 
that while the transfer from the forklift position to the track laborer 
position did not result in a change in pay, the duties of the jobs are 
significantly different.131 The court cited the fact that the track la-
borer position is widely considered by the other Burlington employ-
ees to be a “dirtier” job than that forklift position.132 The court fur-
ther noted that the forklift position required more qualifications 
which it believed added “prestige” to the position.133 The court also 
rejected Burlington’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the jury’s finding that Burlington’s “reasons” for transferring 
White’s job and suspending her.134 Thus, the court affirmed the dis-
                                                                                                                    
 123. Id. at 543-44. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 545 (stating that “ ‘intermediate’ tenure decisions that are appealable 
through a tenure review process cannot form the basis of a Title VII claim”).
 126. White v. Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 801 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 127. Id. at 801-02. 
 128. Id. at 802. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 803. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 804. 
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trict court’s denial of Burlington’s motion for judgment as a matter of 
law.135
 Upon granting the certiorari on the case, the Supreme Court ex-
amined the Sixth Circuit’s decision. Much like the Sixth Circuit, the 
Court focused primarily on interpreting the language of Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision. In doing so, the Court first addressed the 
scope of the provision.136 Burlington’s contention in its appeal of the 
Sixth Circuit decision is that in order to sustain a retaliation claim, 
the alleged retaliation must affect the terms, conditions, or status 
of the employee’s employment.137 Essentially, Burlington suggests 
that the Court should read the antiretaliation provision with the 
antidiscrimination provision in mind.138 Thus, Burlington suggests 
that the antiretaliation provision should be limited to conduct that 
“affects the employee’s ‘compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment.’ “139  
 The Court disagreed, finding that the language of the antiretalia-
tion and antidiscrimination provisions differed and reasoned that 
this difference was not an accident.140 Thus, the Court held that they 
could not read the two provisions in the same way, as Congress likely 
intended the differences in the two provisions.141 The Court stated 
that, along with the differences in the language, the two provisions 
also differed in purpose and therefore were meant to apply to differ-
ent situations.142 Thus, unlike the antidiscrimination provision which 
prohibits actions by an employer based on an employee’s status, the 
antiretaliation provision prohibits actions by an employer based on 
an employee’s actions.143 Further, the Court argued that applying the 
antiretaliation provision in the same way the language of the anti-
discrimination provision applies would not fulfill the purpose of the 
antiretaliation provision, as “[a]n employer can effectively retaliate 
against an employee by taking actions not directly related to his em-
ployment or by causing him harm outside the workplace.”144  
 The Court then addressed the relevant standard for what type of 
conduct falls within the scope of the antiretaliation provision. The 
Court stated that the alleged retaliation must be a materially ad-
                                                                                                                    
 135. Id.  
 136. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2411 (2006). 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Burlington N. & 
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006) (No. 05-259), 2006 WL 622123). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 2412. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.  
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verse action as viewed by a reasonable employee.145 Applying that 
standard to the facts of White’s case, the Court found that there was 
sufficient evidence presented for a jury to find that Burlington vio-
lated the antiretaliation provision in its actions against White.146  
 Burlington further argued that White’s job reassignment cannot 
constitute retaliation when the job description remains the same.147 
The Court quickly dismissed that argument, explaining that all jobs 
are defined by the duties required by the position. As such, there are 
always some job duties that are more or less desirable than others.148 
Thus, insisting that an employee perform the less desirable duties of 
a job is “one good way” of encouraging the employee to refrain from 
filing a complaint.149 The Court further stated that, in the case at is-
sue, there was sufficient evidence before the jury that track laborer 
position duties are widely considered “more arduous and dirtier” 
than those duties associated with the forklift position.150
 The Court also rejected Burlington’s argument that White’s 
thirty-seven-day suspension is outside the realm of Title VII’s antire-
taliation provision. Burlington’s argument centered upon the rein-
statement of White and the back pay provided to her for the time 
missed. Burlington argued that such actions removed the suspension 
from the type of actions Congress intended to stop when it enacted 
the antiretaliation provision.151 The Court deemed Burlington’s ar-
gument less than convincing in light of case law finding injunctions 
to “bar like discrimination in the future” to be a sufficient remedy 
under the antiretaliation provision.152  
 Finally, the Court rejected Burlington’s claim that there was in-
sufficient evidence to support the retaliation claim for the suspen-
sion.153 The Court reasoned that a reasonable employee in White’s 
position would view a thirty-seven-day suspension without pay as a 
hardship, particularly as White did not know when the suspension 
would end.154 Such uncertainty, the Court found, would inevitably 
lead to the emotional and physical stress that White suffered here.155 
Thus, the Court had no problem upholding the jury’s finding that the 
thirty-seven-day suspension was a materially adverse action toward 
 
 145. Id. at 2415. 
 146. Id. at 2416. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 2417. 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id.  
 155. Id.  
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White.156 Therefore, in finding that there was sufficient evidence for a 
jury to find that Burlington violated the antiretaliation provision of Ti-
tle VII by transferring White’s job and suspending her for thirty-seven 
days without pay, the Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s decision.157
 While Justice Alito agreed with the majority’s ultimate decision to 
affirm the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, he took issue with its interpretation 
of the antiretaliation provision.158 In his concurring opinion, Alito 
stated that the majority’s interpretation was incompatible with the 
language of the statute and would likely prove problematic in later 
applications.159 Alito suggests the problem arises in trying to inter-
pret the word “discriminate” in section 704(a).160 Reading section 
704(a) by itself, Alito stated that “discriminate” takes on a literal 
meaning: “to treat differently.”161 However, when read in light of sec-
tion 703(a), he believes the meaning becomes less clear.162 That is, 
reading section 704(a) literally suggests that section 703(a) applies to 
a more narrow scope of actions than section 704(a), which Alito found 
problematic. Therefore, Alito advanced that the proper interpretation 
of “discriminate” in section 704(a) requires that that section and sec-
tion 703(a) be read together.163 He stated that such an interpretation 
“provides an objective standard that permits insignificant claims to 
be weeded out at the summary judgment stage, while providing am-
ple protection for employees who are subjected to real retaliation.”  
 Alito further stated that the majority does not adopt either of in-
terpretations of section 704(a) that he discussed.164 Instead, Alito ex-
plained, the majority adopted another interpretation of the provision 
which does not apply to all retaliatory actions, but only those that 
“well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination.”165
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW–A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE’S FIRST AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS–Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). 
 The United State Supreme Court recently decided Garcetti v. Ce-
ballos.166 The case arose out of a § 1983 complaint filed by a deputy 
                                                                                                                    
 156. Id. at 2418. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. Section 703(a) prohibits “discriminat[ion] against any individual with respect 
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 163. Id. at 2419. 
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district attorney, Richard Ceballos, in the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California.167 The complaint alleged 
that Ceballos suffered adverse employment actions in retaliation for 
a memorandum written in which he advised the dismissal of a case 
on the basis of purported government misconduct.168 Ceballos 
claimed that such action by his employer violated his First Amend-
ment right to free speech.169 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine whether a government employer’s discipline for speech in 
the course of his duties violated the employee’s First Amendment 
rights.170
 Richard Ceballos was employed as a deputy district attorney in 
the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Pomona branch office.171 
He worked as a calendar deputy, where he exercised supervision over 
other lawyers.172 In February 2000, Ceballos was contacted by a de-
fense attorney who claimed that there were inaccuracies in an affi-
davit used to obtain a critical search warrant in a pending criminal 
case.173 In a not unusual custom, the defense attorney asked Ceballos 
to review the case as he had filed a motion to traverse, or challenge, 
the warrant.174 After investigation, Ceballos determined the affidavit 
contained serious misrepresentations and informed his supervisors 
Carol Najera and Frank Sundstedt of such, as well as prepared a 
disposition memorandum expressing his recommendation of dis-
missal.175 After Ceballos submitted the memo on March 2, Ceballos, 
Najera, and Sundstedt, along with the warrant affiant and other 
sheriff’s department employees, held a meeting to discuss the affida-
vit.176 The meeting reportedly became “heated,” with a lieutenant 
criticizing Ceballos’ handling of the case.177 Sundstedt proceeded 
with the case over Ceballos’ concerns.178 At a hearing for the de-
fense’s motion to traverse, Ceballos testified for the defense about the 
affidavit.179 The court denied the defense attorney’s motion to trav-
erse.180
 Ceballos claims that subsequent to his testimony at the hearing, 
“he was subjected to a series of retaliatory employment actions,” in-
 
 167. Id. at 1956. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 1951. 
 171. Id. at 1955. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id.  
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 1955-56. 
 176. Id. at 1956. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
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cluding a demotion to a trial deputy position, transfer to another 
courthouse, and promotion denial.181 After a denial of an employment 
grievance (which found he had not suffered any retaliation), he filed a § 
1983 claim182 in the United States District Court for the Central District 
of California, alleging that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
had been violated in retaliation for the March 2 memorandum.183  
 In response to his suit, the Petitioner filed a motion for summary 
judgment.184 In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the dis-
trict court determined whether Ceballos’ complaint alleged that a 
constitutional right had been violated and, if so, whether the right 
was “clearly established.”185  
 The district court stated that determining whether speech is pro-
tected by the First Amendment was a matter of law for the courts to 
decide.186 The court found that “[i]n determining whether a public 
employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment, the thresh-
old inquiry is whether the statements at issue substantially address 
a matter of public concern. [If not,] the First Amendment is not trig-
gered and it is unnecessary to scrutinize the reasons for the em-
ployer’s action.”187 If the threshold inquiry is met, the court will en-
gage in a balancing test, weighing “the interests of the employee in 
commenting on matters of public concern with the interest of the 
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public ser-
vices it performs.”188 In determining whether an employee’s speech 
addresses a matter of public concern, the courts must address the 
content, form, and context of the speech.189  
 In applying this test to Ceballos, the court found that while the 
memorandum did address a “matter of public” concern, Ceballos pre-
pared and submitted the memorandum as part of his duties as a cal-
endar deputy.190 Citing Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, the court agreed 
with the Petitioner that the speech Ceballos engaged in was “not 
merely as a concerned citizen but within the scope of [his] employ-
ment” and consequently did “not address a matter of public concern, 
even if the incident that triggered the speech may itself be a matter 
                                                                                                                    
 181. Id. 
 182. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
 183. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1956. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Ceballos v. Garcetti, No. CV0011106AHMAJWX, 2002 WL 34098285, at *4 
(C.D. Cal. 2002) 
 186. Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983)). 
 187. Id. (citing Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of the Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 
971, 978 (9th Cir. 1998)).
 188. Id. (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 
 189. Id. at *5 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (1983)). 
 190. Id. 
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of public concern.”191 Therefore, due to the context in which Ceballos 
uttered his speech, he was not protected by the First Amendment.192
 The district court further found that even if Ceballos’ speech was 
protected under the First Amendment, his right was not “clearly es-
tablished.”193 For a right to be clearly established, “ ‘the contours of 
the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that right.’ “194 The court 
found that Ceballos’ speech was not protected by the First Amend-
ment because it was not clearly established that his March 2 memo-
randum addressed a matter of public concern.195  
 Due to these findings, the court declined to engage in a balancing 
test of whether Ceballos’ interests outweighed the interests of the 
state and granted the Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment.196
 Ceballos appealed the district court’s decision, and the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed.197 The Ninth Circuit followed the analysis set forth in 
Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 
205, Will County, Illinois198 and Connick v. Myers199 in determining 
whether Ceballos’ speech was protected.200  
 First, the Ninth Circuit found that Ceballos’ memo, which ad-
dressed possible government misconduct, was “inherently a matter of 
public concern.”201 Moreover, the court found “that a public em-
ployee’s speech is [not] deprived of First Amendment protection 
whenever those views are expressed, to government workers or oth-
ers, pursuant to an employment responsibility.”202 The court rejected 
a per se rule that stripped a public employee of First Amendment 
protection for speech made within his or her employment duties, cit-
ing the adverse affect such a rule would have on whistleblowers.203
 Next, the Ninth Circuit balanced Ceballos’ interest in making the 
speech against the petitioner’s interest in protecting the workplace 
                                                                                                                    
 191. Id. (citing Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, 239 F.3d 939, 941 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that plaintiff’s ordinary duties of writing reports on police misconduct did not involve mat-
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 192. Id. at *6. 
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 194. Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). 
 195. Id. at *7. 
 196. Id. at *7 n.6. 
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 199. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 200. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1173. 
 201. Id. at 1174. 
 202. Id. at 1174-75 (citing Roth v. Veterans Admin. of Govt. of U.S., 856 F.2d 1401, 
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 203. Id. at 1176. 
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against inefficiency and disruption, finding for the former.204 The 
court found that the Petitioner failed to show how Ceballos’ memo 
created any disruption in the workplace.205 Moreover, it found that 
Ceballos’ speech addressed concerns about possible corruption or 
unlawfulness in the sheriff’s department, which was an area of great 
public concern.206
 Finally, the court found that Ceballos’ First Amendment rights 
were clearly established and that the Petitioner’s actions were not 
objectively reasonable.207 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the 
case.208
 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth 
Circuit’s reversal.209 The Court first noted that the “First Amend-
ment protects a public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to 
speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.”210 In explain-
ing the Court’s doctrine, Justice Kennedy used Pickering211 to illus-
trate.212  
 In Pickering, a teacher wrote a letter to a local newspaper which, 
inter alia, attacked the school board’s funding policies.213 In estab-
lishing a balancing test to determine to what extent the school board 
could control the speech of its employees, the Court stated that it 
needed to strike “a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a 
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the inter-
est of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employees.”214 The Court ulti-
mately found that the teacher’s actions did not interfere with the 
teacher’s performance of his duties or operation of the school gener-
ally.215 In finding for the teacher, the Court found that “the interest 
of the school administration in limiting teachers’ opportunities to 
contribute to public debate is not significantly greater than its inter-
est in limiting a similar contribution by any member of the general 
public.”216 The Court used the analysis set forth in this decision to 
evaluate the Ninth Circuit court’s decision.217
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 210. Id. at 1957. 
 211. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 212. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1957. 
 213. 391 U.S. at 566.  
 214. Id. at 568. 
 215. Id. at 572-73. 
 216. Id. at 573. 
 217. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1958. 
1018  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:997 
 
 The Court stated that analysis first requires a determination of 
whether “the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public con-
cern.”218 If not, the employee has no First Amendment protection 
against an employer’s reaction to the speech.219 If so, then the rele-
vant question becomes whether the “government entity had an ade-
quate justification for treating the employee differently from any 
other member of the general public.”220 The Court found that the gov-
ernment had broad discretion to limit speech when acting as an em-
ployer, but that such restriction “must be directed at speech that has 
some potential to affect the entity’s operations.”221
 In its analysis, the Court first determined whether Ceballos spoke 
as a citizen on a matter of public concern.222 The Court found that 
neither the fact that Ceballos stated his views within the office 
(rather than publicly) nor the fact that the memo concerned a matter 
of Ceballos’ employment were dispositive factors.223 Rather, the 
Court found the controlling factor to be that Ceballos’ “expressions 
were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy.”224 Specifi-
cally, the Court held “that when public employees make statements 
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as 
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does 
not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”225 The 
Court rationalized that such restriction was reasonable because it 
gave an employer exercise to discipline an employee over speech that 
he “commissioned or created.”226 The Court further noted the inter-
ests that a government employer has in managing its employees, es-
pecially when considering that actions by government employees can 
affect official communications.227
 The majority further found that the contrary rule proposed by the 
Ninth Circuit and Ceballos would “commit state and federal courts to 
a new, permanent, and intrusive role, mandating judicial oversight of 
communications between and among government employees and 
their superiors in the course of official business.”228 The Court cited both 
federalism and separation of power concerns as reasons for the Court to 
avoid intruding upon the province of government employers.229
                                                                                                                    
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 1959. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1959-60. 
 225. Id. at 1960. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 1960-61. 
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 In addressing the Ninth Circuit’s concern about government employ-
ers insulating their entity from whistleblowers, the Court found that 
adequate protection existed in legislative enactments, such as whistle-
blower protection and labor statutes. In the case of attorneys, the Court 
found further solace in the safeguards provided by rules of conduct and 
constitutional obligations apart from the First Amendment.230
 Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg, 
dissented from the majority opinion.231 Justice Souter disagreed with 
the Court’s finding that speech made pursuant to a public employee’s 
official duties is not protected by the First Amendment.232 Justice 
Souter found no adequate justification for the line drawn by the ma-
jority denying protection to speech made in the course of official du-
ties.233 He states that to do so, “the community [is] deprived of in-
formed opinions on important public issues,” which he cites as the 
underpinning of the Court’s decision in Pickering.234 Rather, Justice 
Souter suggests a modified Pickering balancing test in which “an 
employee commenting on subjects in the course of duties should 
not prevail on balance unless he speaks on a matter of unusual 
importance and satisfies high standards of responsibility in the 
way he does it.”235
 Justice Breyer, in a separate dissenting opinion, similarly found 
the majority’s per se rule too restrictive, but would apply the 
Pickering balancing test in this case, without any modification as 
Justice Souter advocates.236
 Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion as well, finding 
that speech made by a government employee pursuant to his official 
duties should not always be denied First Amendment protection.237
                                                                                                                    
 230. Id. at 1962. 
 231. Id. at 1963 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 1965. 
 234. Id. at 1966 (citing San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004)).  
 235. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1967. 
 236. Id. at 1975-76 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 237. Id. at 1963 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT–FEES AND COSTS–MEDICAL LIABILITY 
CLAIMANTS MUST BE INFORMED OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO A 
PERCENTAGE OF DAMAGES IN CONTINGENCY FEE ARRANGEMENTS, 
ALTERNATIVE TERMS FOR ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION, AND THE 
RIGHT TO WAIVE THE PERCENTAGE IN WRITING AND UNDER OATH–In 
Re: Amendment to the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar—Rule 4-
1.5(f)(4)(B) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 939 So. 2d 1032, 
1036-37 (Fla. 2006). 
 The Florida Supreme Court recently adopted an amendment to 
Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, concern-
ing fees and costs in medical liability cases.238 In doing so, the 
Court acknowledged a 2004 amendment to the Florida Constitu-
tion providing that claimants in medical liability claims would re-
ceive at minimum 70% of the first $250,000.00 of damages and 
90% of damages thereafter.239  
 After voters originally approved the constitutional amendment in 
2004, attorney Stephen H. Grimes, along with fifty-five other attor-
neys, presented an amendment to Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B), proposing that 
attorney’s fees should not exceed 30% of the first $250,000.00 of 
damages and 10% of damages thereafter.240 The Florida Bar then 
filed a response in opposition, objecting to the absence of a provision 
for claimants to waive this right.241 After oral argument, the court 
requested that the Florida Bar propose its own amendment with an 
acknowledgement of the new provisions in the Florida Constitution, 
an obligation to notify potential medical liability clients of the new 
provisions, and a procedure where medical liability claimants could 
waive their rights under the new provisions.242 After submitting the 
proposal to the court, the Bar published it in the Florida Bar News, 
where it received negative comments from Grimes on behalf of the 
 
 238. In Re: Amendment to the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar—Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B) of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, 939 So. 2d 1032, 1036-37 (Fla. 2006) [hereinafter Rule 
4-1.5(f)(4)(B) Amendment Adoption]. 
 239. Id. The full version of the amendment reads:  
In any medical liability claim involving a contingency fee, the claimant is enti-
tled to receive no less than 70% of the first $250,000.00 in all damages re-
ceived by the claimant, exclusive of reasonable and customary costs, whether 
received by judgment, settlement, or otherwise, and regardless of the number 
of defendants. The claimant is entitled to 90% of all damages in excess of 
$250,000.00, exclusive of reasonable and customary costs and regardless of the 
number of defendants. This provision is self-executing and does not require 
implementing legislation.  
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 26. 
 240. Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B) Amendment Adoption, supra note 238, at 1036-37. 
 241. Id.  
 242. Id. at 1037.  
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other fifty-five petitioners.243 The court heard oral arguments again 
and ultimately accepted the Bar’s proposal with modifications.244  
 Most of the negative comments to the proposal focused on the 
waiver provisions.245 Opponents claimed the personal rights in article 
I, section 26 could not be waived because of policies not controlled by 
claimants.246 However, the court sided with the Bar and noted that 
“most personal constitutional rights may be waived,” including the 
right to remain silent,247 the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,248 
and Florida’s constitutional right to homestead protection.249 The 
court specifically stated that the language in article I, section 26 did 
not specifically prohibit waivers for the rights therein.250  
 Additionally, the court considered complaints by other opponents 
of the Florida Bar that the draft did not mandate judicial approval 
for waivers.251 Opponents contended judicial approval was necessary 
because of the conflict of interest between lawyers discussing fee 
limitations with potential clients.252 However, the court disliked 
Grimes’ alternative approval provision.253 The court noted Grimes’ 
provision put the burden upon potential clients to prove they under-
took a “reasonable effort” to find counsel to represent them without a 
waiver. Ultimately the court rejected the provision so as to not re-
strict a “competent adult” client’s right to waive article I, section 26 
rights and held that the Bar’s proposal balanced both the interests of 
attorneys and potential clients during negotiation for representa-
tion.254 The waiver form the court accepted included the exact lan-
guage of article I, section 26, but also required clients to acknowledge 
waiver of a constitutional right and an increase in attorney’s fees, the 
right to have the waiver explained by another attorney or a court, 
and the right to cancel the waiver within three business days.255 It 
also required clients to acknowledge that they “knowingly and volun-
tarily” waived their constitutional rights and did so because the at-
torney or firm of choice could not be retained without waiving his or 
 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 1037-38.  
 245. Id. at 1038. 
 246. Id. 
 247. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 248. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 249. Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B) Amendment Adoption, supra note 238, at 1038 (citing In re 
Shambow’s Estate, 15 So. 2d 837, 837 (Fla. 1943); City of Treasure Island v. Strong, 215 
So. 2d 473, 479 (Fla. 1968)).  
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 1037-39.  
 254. Id.at 1039.  
 255. Id.  
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her constitutional rights.256 Additionally, the court adjusted the form 
to require clients to specifically acknowledge the exact percentage 
fees listed in Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B).257 In adopting a modified version of 
the Bar’s provisions, the court relied on the Bar’s representation that 
the judiciary received no complaints of “overreaching” with the cur-
rent waivers for fees258 and stressed that potential clients could still 
request judicial approval of the waiver even though it was not man-
datory.259 The court noted that other courts could still inquire as to 
whether the waiver was “knowingly and voluntarily” made.260
 Although all seven justices agreed to adopt the Bar’s proposal, 
Justice Wells and Justice Bell dissented to one provision concerning 
judicial review.261 Both justices preferred that trial judges review all 
clients’ waivers to make sure all clients understood what rights they 
were waiving, how the waivers affected each client’s individual case, 
and that the waivers were truly voluntary.262 Justice Wells noted 
that many clients in medical liability claims “are not legally sophisti-
cated” and in an unequal bargaining position when negotiating with 
a lawyer due to the stress of their physical and mental injuries.263 
Justice Wells recognized that most clients would sign forms and 
documents with long blocks of text, even without reading or compre-
hending the material within them.264  
 Additionally, Justice Wells did not agree with the majority’s re-
port that the judicial review already in place by Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B) 
was, in essence, “form over substance.”265 Justice Wells drew from his 
experience as a trial judge, the Florida courts’ history of judicial re-
view of other waivers, and United States Supreme Court decisions in 
determining that clients must understand their constitutional rights 
before voluntarily and effectively waiving them.266 In his dissent, 
Justice Wells stated that individual judicial review “ensures that an 
individual’s constitutional rights are protected” and that it “logically 
must follow” the constitutional limitation.267 While recognizing that 
judicial review would place an extra burden on attorneys, Justice 
 
 256. Id. at 1039-40. 
 257. Id.  
 258. Id. at 1040 n.4.  
 259. Id. at 1040.  
 260. Id.  
 261. Id. at 1040-41. 
 262. Id. at 1041. 
 263. Id.  
 264. Id.   
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 266. Id. at 1042.  
 267. Id. at 1042-43. 
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Wells noted that attorneys are under an obligation to “go the extra 
step” to protect the public’s constitutional rights.268
 
 
 268. Id. at 1043. 
